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Guidance for Control of Carbapenem-resistant 
Enterobacteriaceae
This document contains two parts. Part 1 contains recommendations for healthcare facilities 
and is intended to expand upon the March 2009 “Guidance for Control of Carbapenem- 
Resistant or Carbapenemase-Producing Enterobacteriaceae in Acute-Care Facilities.”
Part 2 reviews the role of public health authorities in the control of carbapenem-resistant 
Enterobacteriaceae.
Unless otherwise specified, healthcare facilities refer to all acute care hospitals and any 
long-term care facility that cares for patients who remain overnight and regularly require 
medical or nursing care (e.g., maintenance of indwelling devices, intravenous injections, 
wound care, etc.). This would include all long-term acute care hospitals and skilled nursing 
homes (including certain rehabilitation facilities), but would generally exclude assisted living 
facilities and nursing homes that do not provide more than basic medical care. In addition, 
this toolkit is not intended for use in ambulatory care facilities.
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B a c k g ro u n d
The emergence and dissemination 
of carbapenem resistance among 
Enterobacteriaceae in the United States 
represent a serious threat to public health. 
These organisms are associated with high 
mortality rates and have the potential to 
spread widely. Decreasing the impact of 
these organisms will require a coordinated 
effort involving all stakeholders including 
healthcare facilities and providers, public 
health, and industry. This document 
expands on the 2009 Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) and 
Healthcare Infection Control Practices 
Advisory Committee (HICPAC) 
recommendations and will continue 
to evolve as new information becomes 
available.
The approach to controlling transmission 
of these organisms in healthcare facilities 
includes the following:
• Recognizing these organisms 
as epidemiologically important
• Understanding the prevalence 
in their region
• Identifying colonized and infected 
patients when present in the facility
• Implementing regional and facility- 
based interventions designed to stop 
the transmission o f these organisms
Carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae 
(CRE) appear to have been uncommon 
in the United States before 1992.
However, carbapenemase-producing 
Enterobacteriaceae, most commonly 
producing Klebsiella pneumoniae 
carbapenemase (KPC), have disseminated 
widely throughout the United States 
since being first reported in 2001.
Despite the spread of KPC-producing 
Enterobacteriaceae, the current U.S. 
distribution of CRE appears to be 
heterogeneous; these organisms are 
commonly isolated from patients in some 
parts of the United States, but they are 
not regularly found in patients from other 
regions. Even in areas where CRE are 
found they may be more common in some 
healthcare settings, such as long-term acute 
care, than they are in others.
In addition to KPC-producing 
Enterobacteriaceae, several different metallo- 
ß-lactamase-producing strains have been 
identified in the United States since 2009. 
These include the New Delhi metallo- 
ß-lactamase (NDM ), Verona integron- 
encoded metallo-ß-lactamase (VIM), and 
the imipenemase (IMP) metallo-ß- 
lactamase. These enzymes are more common 
in other areas o f the world and in the 
United States have generally been found 
among patients who received medical care 
in countries where these organisms are 
known to be present.
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CRE are epidem iologically 
im portan t for several reasons:
• CRE have been associated with 
high mortality rates (up to 40 
to 50% in some studies).
• In addition to 3-lactam/ 
carbapenem resistance, CRE 
often carry genes that confer high 
levels of resistance to many other 
antimicrobials, often leaving very 
limited therapeutic options. 
“Pan-resistant” KPC-producing 
strains have been reported.
• CRE have spread throughout many 
parts o f the United States and 
have the potential to spread more 
widely.
D e f in itio n s
CD C has developed the following interim 
surveillance definition for CRE. CRE are 
defined as Enterobacteriaceae that are:
• Nonsusceptible to one of the 
following carbapenems: doripenem, 
meropenem, or imipenem AND
• Resistant to all of the following 
third-generation cephalosporins 
that were tested: ceftriaxone, 
cefotaxime, and ceftazidime.
(Note: All three of these 
antimicrobials are recommended 
as part o f the primary or secondary 
susceptibility panels for 
Enterobacteriaceae)
Klebsiella species and Escherichia coli 
that meet the CRE definition are 
a priority for detection and 
containment in all settings; however, 
other Enterobacteriaceae (e.g., 
Enterobacter species) might also 
be important in some regions.
For bacteria that have intrinsic 
imipenem nonsusceptibility 
(i.e., Morganella morganii, Proteus 
spp., Providencia spp.), requiring 
nonsusceptibility to carbapenems other 
than imipenem as part of the definition 
might increase specificity.
This CRE surveillance definition 
is based upon the current (M100-S22 
2012) Clinical and Laboratory 
Standards Institute (CLSI) 
interpretative criteria (breakpoints) 
for carbapenem susceptibility among 
Enterobacteriaceae (Appendix A); 
if the older CLSI breakpoints 
(pre-dating M100-S20 U) are being 
used to determine carbapenem 
susceptibility, consideration should 
be given to including ertapenem in the 
CRE definition to increase sensitivity.
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Changes in the breakpoints are shown 
in Appendix A. Although the use o f the 
current CLSI breakpoints offers laboratories 
a simpler and more straightforward 
approach to identifying CRE, adoption 
may be delayed by the fact that the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration has not yet 
approved all of these breakpoints and some 
automated susceptibility panels currently 
do not include dilutions low enough to allow 
for application of the lower breakpoints.
Since most carbapenem resistance mediated 
by carbapenemases in the United States 
is found among Klebsiella spp. and E. 
coli, individual facilities or public health 
authorities might choose to apply the CRE 
surveillance definition only to these specific 
Enterobacteriaceae.
Definitions for CRE are complicated 
by a number of factors including 
the diversity of the genera. Another 
important challenge to developing 
a standardized definition of CRE is a recent 
(mid-2010) change in the Clinical and 
Laboratory Standards Institute (CLSI) 
interpretative criteria (breakpoints) for 
determining susceptibility to carbapenems 
among Enterobacteriaceae. These new 
recommendations lowered the breakpoints 
and removed the requirement for testing 
for carbapenemase (e.g., modified Hodge 
Test) to determine susceptibility.
These breakpoints were further modified 
in January 2012 (M100-S22).
Klebsiella pneumonia
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S u rv e il la n c e
Inpatient facilities should have an awareness 
of whether or not CRE (at least E. coli and 
Klebsiella spp.) have ever been cultured 
from patients admitted to their facility and, 
if so, whether these positive cultures were 
collected within 48 hours of admission.
If  CRE have been present, facilities should 
also determine:
• If  there is evidence o f intra-facility 
transmission
• W hich wards/units are most affected
Facilities that do not have this information 
should consider performing an evaluation 
to quantify the clinical incidence of these 
organisms, such as a review of archived lab 
results to determine the number and/or 
proportion of Enterobacteriaceae that meet 
the CRE definition over a pre-specified 
time period (e.g., 6 to 12 months).
In addition, facilities should consider 
collecting information on the basic 
epidemiology of patients colonized or 
infected with these organisms in order 
to understand common characteristics 
of these individuals. This might include 
patient demographics, dates o f admission, 
outcomes, medications, and common 
exposures (e.g., wards, surgery, procedures, 
etc).
F ac ility -level P re v e n tio n  
S tr a te g ie s
The following briefly summarizes an 
approach to preventing CRE transmission 
in healthcare settings. For a more in-depth 
review, please refer to the CD C  HICPAC 
guidelines “Management of Multidrug- 
Resistant Organisms in Healthcare Settings, 
2006” (http://www.cdc.gov/hicpac/mdro/ 
mdro toc.html).
Core M easures for All Acute 
and Long-term Care Facilities 
There are 8 core m easures 
facilities should follow.
1. Hand Hygiene
Hand hygiene is a primary part of 
preventing multidrug-resistant organism 
(MDRO) transmission. Facilities should 
ensure that healthcare personnel are familiar 
with proper hand hygiene technique as well 
as its rationale. Efforts should be made to 
promote staff ownership of hand hygiene 
using techniques like developing local (e.g., 
unit) hand hygiene champions. It is not 
enough to have policies that require hand 
hygiene; hand hygiene adherence should 
be monitored and adherence rates should 
be fed directly back to front line staff. 
Immediate feedback should be provided 
to staff who miss opportunities for hand 
hygiene. In addition, facilities should 
ensure access to adequate hand hygiene 
stations (i.e., clean sinks and/or alcohol-
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based hand rubs) and ensure they are well 
stocked with supplies (e.g. towels, soap, etc.) 
and clear of clutter. Further information 
on hand hygiene is available at www.cdc. 
gov/handhygiene/. This intervention is 
applicable to both acute and long-term care 
settings.
2. Contact Precautions
Patients in acute care settings who are 
colonized or infected with CRE should 
be placed on Contact Precautions. Systems 
should be in place to identify patients with 
a history of CRE colonization or infection 
at admission so that they can be placed 
on Contact Precautions if not known to be 
free of colonization. In addition, clinical 
laboratories should have an established 
protocol for notifying clinical and/or 
infection prevention personnel when CRE 
are identified from clinical or surveillance 
cultures.
There is not enough information for a firm 
recommendation about when to discontinue 
Contact Precautions among infected 
patients; however, CRE colonization in 
some patients identified during CD C 
investigations has been prolonged (> 6 
months). If  surveillance cultures are used to 
decide if a patient remains colonized, more 
than one culture should be collected in an 
attempt to improve sensitivity. One recent 
study found that among rectal CRE carriers, 
predictors o f rectal CRE carriage at a future 
healthcare encounter included exposure to 
antimicrobials (especially fluoroquinolones), 
admission from another healthcare facility, 
and less than 3 months’ elapsed time since 
their first positive CRE test.
The probability of being CRE positive 
at the next encounter increased to 50% 
if one predictor was present. Presence 
o f ongoing risk factors for carriage such 
as these should be considered before 
discontinuing use o f Contact Precautions 
in these patients. The presence of CRE 
infection or colonization alone should 
not preclude transfer of a patient from 
one facility to another (e.g., acute care 
to long-term care). Facilities should 
ensure that Contact Precautions are used 
correctly by staff caring for all patients 
with epidemiologically important MDROs 
including CRE.
Proper use of Contact 
Precautions includes:
• Performing hand hygiene before 
donning a gown and gloves
• Donning gown and gloves before 
entering the affected patient’s room
• Removing the gown and gloves and 
performing hand hygiene prior to 
exiting the affected patient’s room
Ensuring healthcare personnel (HCP) are 
educated about the proper use and rationale 
for Contact Precautions is an important part 
o f this process. In addition, facilities should 
ensure that there is a process to monitor 
and improve H CP adherence to Contact 
Precautions. This might include conducting 
periodic surveillance on the use o f Contact 
Precautions and providing feedback to 
frontline staff about these results.
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Preemptive Contact Precautions, often 
in conjunction with surveillance cultures, 
might be used on patients transferred 
from high-risk settings (see supplemental 
interventions) pending results o f screening 
cultures. Examples include transferred 
patients from hospitals in countries or 
areas in the United States where CRE 
are common or patients transferred from 
facilities known to have outbreaks or clusters 
of CRE colonized or infected patients.
In long-term care settings, Contact 
Precautions are still indicated for residents 
infected or colonized with CRE; however, 
these might be modified to fit the inherent 
differences between acute and long-term 
care facilities. Contact Precautions should 
be used for residents with CRE who are 
at higher risk for transmission, including 
patients who are totally dependent upon 
H CP for their activities o f daily living, are 
ventilator-dependent, are incontinent of 
stool, or have wounds with drainage that 
is difficult to control. For other residents 
who are able to perform hand hygiene, 
are continent o f stool, are less dependent 
on staff for their activities o f daily living, 
and are without draining wounds, the 
requirement for Contact Precautions might 
be relaxed. However, in these situations 
Standard Precautions should still be 
observed, including the use of gloves and/or 
gowns when contact with colonized/infected 
sites or body fluids is possible.
3. Healthcare Personnel Education 
H CP in all settings who care for patients 
with MDROs, including CRE, should
be educated about preventing transmission 
of these organisms. At a minimum this 
should include information on the proper 
use of Contact Precautions and hand 
hygiene. This intervention is applicable 
to both acute and long-term care settings.
4. Use o f Devices
Use of devices (e.g., central venous 
catheters, endotracheal tubes, urinary 
catheters) puts patients at risk for device­
associated infections and minimizing device 
use is an important part of the effort to 
decrease the incidence o f these infections. 
Additionally, device use has been associated 
with carbapenem resistance among 
Enterobacteriaceae. Therefore, minimizing 
device use in all healthcare settings should 
be part o f the effort to decrease the 
prevalence of all M DROs including CRE. 
In acute and long-term care settings, device 
use should be reviewed regularly 
to ensure they are still required and devices 
should be discontinued promptly when 
no longer needed. For more information 
on preventing device-associated infection 
including appropriate use of devices 
please see www.cdc.gov/hicpac/BSI/BSI- 
guidelines-2011.html and www.cdc.gov/ 
hicpac/cauti/002 cauti toc.htm l.
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5. Patient and Staff Cohorting
W hen available, patients colonized or 
infected with CRE should be housed in 
single patient rooms and if not available 
these patients should be cohorted together.
In addition, consideration should be given to 
cohorting patients with CRE in specific areas 
(e.g., units or wards), even if in single patient 
rooms, and to using dedicated staff to care 
for them. This recommendation applies 
to both acute and long-term care settings. 
Preference for single rooms should be given 
to patients at highest risk for transmission 
such as patients with incontinence, medical 
devices, or wounds with uncontrolled 
drainage.
6. Laboratory Notification
Laboratories should have protocols in 
place that facilitate the rapid notification 
of appropriate clinical and infection 
prevention staff whenever CRE are identified 
from clinical specimens to ensure timely 
implementation of control measures.
This is true for both facilities with on-site 
laboratories and those sending cultures 
off-site and is applicable to acute and long­
term care settings.
7. Antim icrobial Stewardship 
Antimicrobial stewardship is another 
primary part of M DRO control. Although 
the role of this activity specifically for 
CRE has not been well studied, multiple 
antimicrobial classes have been shown to be 
a risk for CRE colonization and/or infection. 
Further, restricting use of carbapenems has 
been associated with a lower incidence of 
carbapenem-resistant Pseudomonas aeruginosa 
in one ecological analysis. As part of an
antimicrobial stewardship program designed 
to minimize transmission of MDROs, 
facilities should work to ensure that 1) 
antimicrobials are used for appropriate 
indications and duration and 2) that the 
narrowest spectrum antimicrobial that 
is appropriate for the specific clinical 
scenario is used. For more information 
on antimicrobial stewardship in healthcare 
settings please see http://www.cdc.gov/ 
getsmart/healthcare. This intervention is 
applicable to both acute and long-term care 
settings.
8. CRE Screening
Screening is used to identify unrecognized 
CRE colonization among epidemiologically- 
linked contacts of known CRE colonized 
or infected patients as clinical cultures will 
usually identify only a fraction of all patients 
with CRE. Generally, this screening has 
involved stool, rectal, or peri-rectal cultures 
and sometimes cultures of wounds or urine 
(if a urinary catheter is present). A laboratory 
protocol for evaluating rectal or peri-rectal 
swabs for CRE is available at http://www. 
cdc.gov/hai/pdfs/labsettings/Klebsiella or E 
coli.pdf; however, it is important to note 
that this procedure has only been validated 
for E. coli and Klebsiella spp. CRE screening 
of epidemiologically linked patients is a 
primary prevention strategy for all healthcare 
facilities; however, it is particularly important 
for healthcare facilities with CRE outbreaks 
or facilities that do not or only rarely admit 
patients with CRE infection or colonization. 
This intervention is applicable to both acute 
and long-term care settings.
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Supplem ental M easures for
CRE screening m ight include:
• Point prevalence surveys:
Point prevalence surveys might 
be an effective way for facilities 
to rapidly evaluate the prevalence 
of CRE in particular wards/units. 
This could be useful in a situation 
where a review o f clinical cultures 
using laboratory records identifies 
unreported CRE patients in certain 
wards/units. A point prevalence 
survey is generally conducted by 
screening all patients in that ward/ 
unit. Point prevalence surveys 
might be done only once if few
or no additional CRE colonized 
patients are identified or might 
be done serially if colonization 
is more widespread or to follow the 
effect of an intervention.
• Screening o f epidem iologically 
linked patients:
If previously unrecognized CRE 
carriers are identified, screening 
of patient contacts could be 
conducted to identify transmission 
instead o f a wider point prevalence 
survey. Those patients considered 
contacts may vary from setting 
to setting; however, they usually 
include roommates of the unrecog­
nized CRE patients as well as 
patients who might have shared 
HCP.
Healthcare Facilities with CRE 
Transmission
These additional measures should be 
considered when baseline core prevention 
practices are not effective in reducing 
CRE incidence.
Active Surveillance Testing
This process involves culturing patients 
who might not be epidemiologically linked 
to known CRE patients but who meet 
certain pre-specified criteria. This could 
include everyone admitted to the facility, 
pre-specified high-risk patients (e.g., those 
admitted from long-term care facilities), 
and/or patients admitted to high-risk 
settings (e.g., intensive care units [ICUs]). 
Active surveillance testing has been used 
in control efforts for several MDROs 
including CRE; however, the exact 
contribution of this practice to decreases 
in CRE is not known.
As described above, active surveillance 
testing is based on the finding that clinical 
cultures will identify only a minority 
o f those patients colonized with CRE; 
unrecognized colonized patients might 
not be on Contact Precautions and are 
a potential source for CRE transmission.
If done, surveillance testing could be focused 
on patients admitted to certain high-risk 
settings (e.g., ICUs, long-term acute care) 
or could target specific patients (i.e., patients 
with risk factors, patients admitted from 
high-risk settings like long-term acute care 
or transferred from areas with high CRE
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prevalence). This testing is generally done 
at admission but can also be done 
periodically during admission 
(e.g., weekly). Patients identified as positive 
by this surveillance testing should be 
treated as colonized (i.e., placed on Contact 
Precautions, etc.). In some situations 
(e.g., patients admitted from high-risk 
settings) patients might be placed in 
preemptive Contact Precautions until 
surveillance testing is found to be negative.
As with screening o f epidemiologically 
linked CRE contacts, the use of active 
surveillance testing to control CRE 
is applicable to both acute and long-term 
care settings.
Chlorhexidine Bathing 
Chlorhexidine bathing has been used 
successfully to prevent certain types 
of healthcare-associated infections (e.g., 
bloodstream infections) and to decrease 
colonization with specific MDROs, 
primarily in ICUs. For CRE, it has been 
used as part of a multifaceted intervention 
to reduce the prevalence o f CRE during 
an outbreak in a long-term acute care 
facility. During chlorhexidine bathing, 
diluted liquid chlorhexidine (2%) or 2% 
chlorhexidine-impregnated wipes are used 
to bathe patients (usually daily) while 
in high-risk settings (e.g., ICUs). The 
chlorhexidine is usually not used above 
the jaw line or on open wounds. When 
chlorhexidine bathing is used for a particular 
patient population or in a particular setting, 
it is usually applied to all patients regardless 
of CRE colonization status.
In long-term care settings this type of an 
intervention might be used on targeted
high-risk residents (e.g., residents that are 
totally dependent upon healthcare personnel 
for activities of daily living, are ventilator- 
dependent, are incontinent of stool, or 
have wounds whose drainage is difficult to 
control) or high-risk settings (e.g., ventilator 
unit). In addition, chlorhexidine bathing 
might be less frequent in long-term care 
depending on the facility’s usual bathing 
protocol.
R ecom m endations for Facilities 
with No or Rare CRE
Experience with other M DROs suggests 
that it might be most effective to intervene 
on emerging M DROs when they first are 
recognized in a facility before they become 
common. For this reason facilities that rarely 
(e.g., < 1 per month) or never have patients 
admitted who are colonized or infected with 
CRE should be aggressive about controlling 
these organisms when they are identified.
An example o f one approach to CRE control 
in these settings is shown in Appendix B.
In addition, if a facility without previous 
CRE performs a review o f archived clinical 
laboratory results for CRE and identifies 
previously unrecognized CRE-colonized 
or -infected patients, the facility should 
consider point prevalence surveys of 
high-risk units to further clarify the CRE 
prevalence. If  additional CRE colonized 
patients are identified, facilities should 
also follow the approach in Appendix B. 
Facilities without CRE that receive patients 
that are transferred from facilities known 
to have CRE colonized or infected patients 
could also consider screening those patients 
for CRE at admission and placing them 
in preemptive Contact Precautions pending 
the result of surveillance cultures.
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Core M easures for All Acute and Long-term Care Facilities
1. Hand hygiene
• P rom ote hand  hygiene
• M o n ito r hand  hygiene adherence and provide feedback
• Ensure access to hand  hygiene stations
2. Contact Precautions
A cute care
• Place C R E  colonized or infected patients on  C on tact Precautions (CP)
° Preem ptive C P  m igh t be used for patients transferred from  high-risk settings
• Educate healthcare personnel about C P
• M o n ito r C P  adherence and provide feedback
• N o recom m endation  can be m ade for d iscontinuation  o f  CP
• D evelop lab protocols for notifying clinicians and  IP about po ten tial CRE
Long-term  care
• Place C R E  colonized or infected residents th a t are high-risk for transm ission on C P  (as described
in  text); for patients at lower risk for transm ission use Standard Precautions for m ost situations
3. Patient and staff cohorting
• W h en  available cohort C R E  colonized or infected patients and the staff th a t care for them  even 
if  patients are housed in  single room s
• I f  the n u m b er o f  single patien t room s is lim ited, reserve these room s for patients w ith  highest risk for 
transm ission (e.g., incontinence)
4. M inim ize use o f invasive devices
5. Promote antim icrobial stewardship
6. Screening
• Screen patien t w ith  epidem iologic links to unrecognized C R E  colonized or infected patients and /o r 
conduct p o in t prevalence surveys o f  units contain ing unrecognized C R E  patients
Supplem ental M easures for Healthcare Facilities with CRE Transmission
1. Conduct active surveillance testing
• Screen high-risk patients at adm ission or at adm ission and  periodically during their facility stay for 
C RE. Preem ptive C P  can be used w hile results o f  adm ission surveillance testing are pending
• C onsider screening patients transferred from  facilities know n to have C R E  at adm ission
2. Chlorhexidine bathing
• B athe patients w ith  2%  chlorhexidine
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P u b lic  H e a lth  E n g a g e m e n t
Inter-facility Transmission o f CRE
Patients colonized or infected with CRE 
may seek medical care in more than one 
hospital and serve as a reservoir that can 
facilitate the spread of CRE from one 
facility to another. W ith the pressure to 
reduce length of stay in acute care hospitals, 
patients who require complex medical 
treatment are often transferred to long­
term care facilities (e.g., long-term acute 
care hospitals and skilled nursing homes) 
to complete their treatment. These patients 
frequently require readmission either to the 
same or different hospitals. This extensive 
inter-facility sharing of patients across the 
continuum of care has the potential to 
facilitate widespread regional transmission 
of CRE.
Regional Approach to  CRE Control
To prevent the emergence and further 
spread of CRE, a coordinated regional 
control effort among healthcare facilities is 
recommended. The implementation of such 
an approach was successful in controlling 
vancomycin-resistant enterococci in the 
Siouxland region of the United States and 
for reducing CRE incidence at the national 
level in Israel. Given the ability of state and 
local health departments to interface with 
different types of facilities, public health 
is in a unique position to coordinate the 
local and regional response to MDROs, like 
CRE, by providing situational awareness
within their jurisdiction and facilitating 
the implementation of appropriate control 
measures.
The optimal public health response will vary 
depending on the prevalence o f CRE within 
a given jurisdiction. Based on an initial 
evaluation of the prevalence or incidence 
o f CRE, prevention strategies can be tailored 
for geographical regions according to the 
following classifications: regions without 
CRE, regions with few CRE colonized- or 
infected-patients, and regions where CRE 
are common. (Although there is no standard 
definition for the latter two categories, some 
criteria that can be considered to determine 
a region’s classification are provided below.) 
In regions where there are no or few CRE 
colonized- or infected-patients, there may 
be a critical opportunity to prevent further 
emergence of CRE by taking an aggressive 
approach early in the process. For regions 
where CRE have already become common, 
certain general prevention measures may 
need to be applied more broadly as outlined 
in the respective section. However, because 
o f the challenges associated with high CRE 
prevalence, it is recommended that further 
tailoring of supplemental measures be 
determined in consultation with CD C  and 
in accordance with the 2006 CD C HICPAC 
“Guidelines for Management of Multidrug- 
Resistant Organisms in Healthcare Settings” 
(http://www.cdc.gov/hicpac/pdf/guidelines/ 
M DROGuideline2006.pdf).
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For this document, a region could represent 
part o f a state, a whole state, or even 
multiple states. In some regions, patients 
may be shared between facilities located 
in different jurisdictions and/or states. 
Ideally for M DRO control, state health 
departments would take the lead and 
coordinate with local health departments. 
However, depending on the region targeted, 
prevention strategies may also require 
coordination between states.
Regional Surveillance 
for CRE
Health departments should understand 
the prevalence or incidence of CRE 
in their jurisdiction by performing some 
form o f regional surveillance for these 
organisms. As described above, the interim 
CD C surveillance definition for CRE 
is Enterobacteriaceae that are nonsusceptible 
to one of the carbapenems and resistant 
to all of the third-generation cephalosporins 
that were tested. At a minimum, initial 
surveillance efforts should focus on key 
organisms (i.e., K. pneumoniae, E. coli, 
and Enterobacter spp. that meet the CRE 
definition).
Options for performing surveillance include 
making CRE a laboratory-reportable 
event or surveying Infection Preventionists 
and/or laboratory directors of healthcare 
facilities by telephone or email (e.g., using 
online survey). An example o f a survey for 
Infection Preventionists in acute care and 
long-term acute care hospitals can be found 
in Appendix C; this survey could also be 
modified for use in other long-term care 
facilities.
It is recommended that CRE surveys con­
ducted by health departments collect, at a 
minimum, the following facility-level data:
• Facility demographics including 
location and facility name if possible
• Overall frequency of CRE detection 
(e.g., daily, weekly, monthly, etc.)
• Frequency o f CRE cases by timing 
of detection (e.g., within 48 hours or 
greater than 48 hours of admission)
• If  surveying Infection Preventionists, 
determine whether recommended 
surveillance and infection prevention 
measures are being implemented, as 
outlined in Part 1
Email reminders or phone calls to non­
responders are encouraged to facilitate 
survey completion in a timely fashion 
(e.g., 1-2 weeks) and increase response 
rates. Based on survey/surveillance results, 
prevention strategies can be tailored 
accordingly as outlined below and in the 
algorithms provided in appendix D.
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R e g io n a l P re v e n tio n  
S tr a te g ie s
Regions with No CRE Identified
Regional Surveillance and Feedback of 
Results
In regions that have no identified CRE 
colonized- or infected-patients, it is 
recommended that health departments 
take an aggressive approach to future CRE 
detection, such as making CRE a reportable 
event (e.g., laboratory reportable) to ensure 
that CRE are recognized when they occur.
If  CRE reporting is not feasible, health 
departments should periodically survey 
healthcare facilities for the presence of 
CRE and provide feedback to increase 
awareness. The frequency o f surveillance 
may depend on the prevalence o f CRE 
in neighboring areas or jurisdictions. For 
example, in an area where nearby locations 
have known CRE colonized- or infected- 
patients, quarterly or even monthly 
surveillance may be reasonable. To maintain 
an understanding of CRE prevalence in 
surrounding regions, neighboring health 
departments should consider establishing 
a mechanism for communicating updates 
with one another about the level o f CRE 
activity within their respective jurisdictions.
Education o f Healthcare Facilities
Health departments should also increase 
awareness among healthcare facilities about 
the public health importance of CRE, 
recommended prevention measures, and 
the importance o f timely recognition of 
any CRE colonized- or infected-patients. 
This could include targeted education 
of Infection Preventionists and other
healthcare personnel and could take place 
at conferences, training sessions, or through 
webinars or newsletters.
Regions with Few CRE Identified
The prevention strategies described in this 
section apply to regions where the majority 
of healthcare facilities do not regularly have 
patients with CRE admitted. This would 
include regions where several facilities 
may have identified CRE colonized- or 
infected-patients on an infrequent basis 
(e.g., monthly basis or greater), as well as 
regions where some facilities may have 
several CRE colonized- or infected-patients 
but are surrounded by facilities with only 
a few or none. In these situations, health 
departments should still take an aggressive 
approach to contain CRE. This may 
require working more closely with specific 
healthcare facilities and targeting prevention 
efforts to certain parts of the region. Regions 
with few CRE are also most in need of 
increased situational awareness across all 
facilities regarding which facilities are being 
most impacted by CRE.
Regional Surveillance and Feedback of 
Results: Targeted Prevention
Health departments should consider making
CRE a reportable event (e.g., laboratory
reportable) to track CRE rates within their
jurisdiction for the purposes of identifying
new cases and assessing the efficacy of
infection prevention measures. If  this is not
feasible, health departments should still
continue to periodically survey acute and
long-term care facilities for the presence of
CRE.
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CRE surveillance results should be shared 
with facilities (e.g., via newsletters, emails, 
or presentations at regional conferences), 
including facility administrators, in order 
to provide awareness of the current regional 
situation with respect to CRE; knowing 
which facilities have CRE colonized- or 
infected-patients may be one of the most 
important benefits o f a coordinated regional 
approach to CRE control, allowing nearby 
facilities to take appropriate action. For 
example, patients admitted from facilities 
that have CRE could be placed preemptively 
on Contact Precautions pending surveillance 
culture results. Even if facility identifiers 
cannot be revealed, health departments 
can provide feedback of results stratified by 
facility type or by geographical distribution. 
Knowing which parts of the region have 
CRE can allow nearby facilities to intensify 
CRE prevention efforts (e.g., using 
supplemental measures) in consultation with 
the health department.
Im plem entation o f Prevention 
Measures
In all facilities, health departments should 
ensure that core prevention measures 
(e.g., hand hygiene, Contact Precautions, 
patient and staff cohorting) are being 
implemented accordingly. Particularly in 
facilities that have CRE, it is recommended 
that health departments work closely with 
the infection prevention personnel to 
review and improve facility adherence to 
recommended practices. This may involve 
ongoing communication with infection 
prevention personnel, conducting site visits 
where feasible, providing in-service training,
and engaging the facility directors and/ 
or administrators in discussions about the 
importance o f CRE prevention.
In facilities without CRE, health 
departments should take steps to ensure that 
a plan is in place in the event that a CRE 
colonized- or infected-patient is identified. 
Additionally, health departments should 
work closely with individual facilities that 
have not identified CRE to determine 
appropriate supplemental interventions. 
These measures may include targeting active 
surveillance testing and preemptive Contact 
Precautions to patients admitted from 
facilities with ongoing transmission o f CRE 
(e.g., CRE detection on at least a weekly 
basis or in a CRE outbreak situation).
If  facility identifiers cannot be disclosed, 
targeted use of active surveillance testing 
and preemptive Contact Precautions can 
be guided by the local epidemiology of 
CRE. Specifically, in facilities without CRE 
but located in areas where CRE are present, 
active surveillance testing and preemptive 
Contact Precautions could be applied 
to the following patients: (a) those admitted 
from long-term care facilities (e.g., long­
term acute care hospitals), where there may 
be a large reservoir of CRE colonized- or 
infected-patients as a result of inter-facility 
patient sharing and longer length of stay 
and/or (b) those with potential risk factors 
for CRE (e.g., patients with open wounds, 
presence o f indwelling devices, and/or high 
antimicrobial usage).
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In facilities with known CRE, 
health departments should promote 
implementation of surveillance measures to 
identify additional cases in order to prevent 
further intra-facility CRE transmission. 
These interventions may include screening 
patients with epidemiologic links to 
previously unrecognized cases and 
conducting periodic point prevalence 
surveys in high-risk settings (e.g., ICUs). 
Health departments should also promote 
inter-facility communication as described 
in the following section. As needed, health 
departments should consult with CD C and/ 
or regional experts for additional guidance.
Inter-facility Communication 
To reduce inter-facility transmission o f all 
MDROs, all facilities should be encouraged 
to routinely complete inter-facility transfer 
forms whenever a patient is transferred 
to another facility; this becomes especially 
important when a patient with known 
CRE colonization or infection is to be 
transferred to another facility. The form 
should indicate whether the patient has 
ever been colonized and/or infected with 
CRE and other M DROs (if available, the 
dates and results of any relevant clinical 
and/or surveillance cultures should be 
provided) and whether the patient has any 
open wounds and/or indwelling devices.
In addition, if the patient is currently 
being given antimicrobials, information 
should be included describing why the 
patient is receiving them and how much 
longer treatment is required. An example 
of an inter-facility transfer form developed 
by CD C is available for facilities to use 
(http://www.cdc.gov/HAI/toolkits/ 
InterfacilityTransferCommunicationForm 
11-2010.pdf)
Education o f Healthcare Facilities
Education for healthcare facility staff about 
CRE and recommended surveillance and 
prevention measures should continue to be 
provided as described above. This might 
be especially important for facilities that 
have not detected CRE in order to increase 
their vigilance.
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Regions W here CRE are Comm on
In general, CRE are considered common 
in regions where the majority of healthcare 
facilities have identified cases, and these 
facilities regularly have CRE colonized- 
or infected-patients admitted (e.g., CRE 
detected at least weekly).
Whereas a targeted approach to prevention 
may be successful in regions with few 
CRE cases, limited experiences indicate 
that a broad, public health approach 
is required when CRE are common.
The national implementation of a centrally- 
coordinated intervention in Israel succeeded 
in containing CRE. Their success was 
attributed in part to the creation of a 
task force dedicated to ensuring that all 
hospitals complied with national CRE 
guidelines. Based on Israel’s experience 
and the 2006 CD C HICPAC “Guidelines 
for Management of Multidrug-Resistant 
Organisms in Healthcare Settings” (http:// 
www.cdc.gov/hicpac/pdf/guidelines/ 
M DRQGuideline2006.pdf), the following 
prevention measures are recommended for 
regions where CRE are common:
Dedicated Personnel 
To effectively coordinate infection 
prevention across the region, health 
departments should have dedicated 
personnel assigned to this task. Ideally, 
these personnel should have an adequate 
understanding of CRE/M DRO prevention 
practices. As needed, a health department­
led advisory panel consisting of experienced 
professionals in infection prevention and 
clinical microbiology can be established 
to provide additional technical support 
to facilities.
Engagement o f Healthcare Facilities 
As an initial step to engaging all facilities 
in the region, health departments 
should first communicate to appropriate 
personnel the CRE prevalence within the 
region and the importance of a regional 
approach to prevention. This may involve 
discussions with the facility directors and/or 
administrators in addition to the infection 
prevention personnel. The purpose of these 
discussions is to convey the urgency of the 
situation and to obtain facility leadership 
support to prioritize CRE prevention.
Reinforcement o f Core Prevention 
Measures
Health departments should review current 
infection control policies and practices 
related to CRE at all acute and long­
term care facilities within the region.
At a minimum, all facilities should be 
implementing the core measures for CRE 
prevention (e.g., hand hygiene, Contact 
Precautions, patient and staff cohorting).
To reinforce best practices, targeted 
education and in-service training may need 
to be provided to individual facilities.
Im plem entation o f Supplemental 
Measures
Additional measures to be implemented 
by facilities should be determined in close 
consultation with the health department 
and in accordance with the interventions 
summarized in Part 1 of this document 
and the Tier 2 recommendations of the 
2006 CD C HICPAC Guidelines for 
Management of Multidrug-resistant 
Organisms in Healthcare Settings (http:// 
www.cdc.gov/hicpac/pdf/guidelines/ 
M DROGuideline2006.pdf). These 
interventions may include performing active 
surveillance testing and/or chlorhexidine 
bathing.
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Assessing Facility Compliance 
to  Prevention Measures
Health departments should periodically
assess for facility compliance to
recommended practices (e.g., on a monthly
basis). This may be based on reporting by
facility Infection Preventionists or assessed
through site visits to individual facilities
if feasible. Depending on compliance rates,
additional educational outreach, such
as in-service trainings and webinars, may
need to be provided to individual facilities.
To increase staff adherence, performance
feedback should be shared with facility
directors and/or administrators. Health
departments can also consider providing
feedback o f aggregate compliance data
stratified by facility type and/or by
geographical distribution, so that individual
facilities can compare their performance
with others.
Inter-facility Communication
As described previously, an inter-facility 
transfer form should be completed whenever 
a patient is being transferred to another 
facility. This should indicate the CRE 
status o f the patient and the presence 
of open wounds and indwelling devices 
and antimicrobial usage.
Regional Surveillance and Feedback of 
Results
Health departments should continue 
to perform periodic regional surveillance 
to assess efficacy of infection prevention 
measures and to feedback results to facilities. 
Although it may not be practical to make 
every CRE case reportable in a region 
where CRE are common, certain events 
to consider making reportable could be an 
increase in CRE rate above baseline or CRE 
cases with unique features (e.g., all fatalities 
or healthy patients with fatal outcome).
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Appendix A: Previous and Current Clinical and Laboratory Standards 
Institute Interpretive Criteria for C arbapenem s and Enterobacteriaceae
Agent
Previous Breakpoints (M100-S19) 
MIC (pg/mL)
Current Breakpoints (M100-S22) 
MIC (pg/mL)
Susceptible Intermediate Resistant Susceptible Intermediate Resistant
Doripenem - - - <1 2 <4
Ertapenem <2 4 >8 <0.5 1 >2
Im ipenem <4 8 >16 <1 2 >4
Meropenem <4 8 >16 <1 2 >4
Clinical and Laboratory Standards Institute (CLSI). Performance Standards for Antimicrobial Susceptibility 
Testing; Twenty Second Informational Supplement (January 2012). CLSI document M100-S22. Wayne, 
Pennsylvania, 2012.
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Appendix B: General A pproach to  C arbapenem -resistant Enterobacteri- 
aceae (CRE) Control in Facilities th a t Rarely or Have Not Identified CRE
New CRE-colonized or CRE-infected patient identified
È
• Notify appropriate personnel (i.e., clinical staff, infection prevention staff)
• Notify public health if indicated
È
• Place patient on Contact Precautions in single room (if available)
• Reinforce hand hygiene and use of Contact Precautions on affected ward/unit
• Educate healthcare personnel about preventing CRE transmission
È
• Screen epidemiologically-linked patient contacts (e.g., roommates) for CRE 
with at least stool, rectal, or peri-rectal cultures and/or consider point prevalence 
survey of affected unit
• Consider preemptive Contact Precautions of these patients pending results 
of screening cultures
È
• If screening cultures or further clinical cultures identify additional CRE- 
colonized or -infected patients, consider additional surveillance cultures of 
contacts or point prevalence surveys o f affected units (if not already done)
• Consider cohorting patients and staff
È
• Ensure if patient transferred within the facility that precautions are continued
Ensure if patient transferred to another facility CRE information is shared with 
accepting facility
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Appendix C: Example of a Survey for Infection Preventionists
Instructions for Adm inistering Survey for Carbapenem-resistant 
Enterobacteriaceae (CRE)
Given the increasing incidence of CRE in parts of the United States and the potential for 
widespread dissemination, health departments are encouraged to assess the incidence o f CRE 
within their jurisdictions to guide response efforts. To facilitate this activity, the attached 
survey has been designed to be used by health departments to determine: 1) the frequency 
of CRE colonized- or infected patients identified, 2) the type of surveillance conducted, and 
3) the infection control measures implemented to prevent transmission.
It is recommended that health departments administer this survey by telephone to infection 
prevention personnel of all acute care hospitals and long-term acute care hospitals within 
their jurisdictions; this survey could also be modified for use in other long-term care facilities. 
The survey consists of 7 questions and will take approximately 5 minutes to complete.
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Survey of Healthcare Facilities for C arbapenem -resistant 
E nterobacteriaceae (CRE)
1. Does the microbiology laboratory that performs cultures for your facility have an estab­
lished system for alerting infection prevention staff in a timely manner (i.e., within 24 hrs) 
whenever a carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae isolate is identified?
□  Yes □  No
2. In the past 12 months, have any CRE infected- or colonized-patients been present
in your facility?
□  Yes □  No
If YES,
a. In general, how often do you identify CRE infected- or colonized-patients from clini­
cal cultures?
□  Daily □  Weekly □  Monthly □  Biannually □  Yearly
b. Specifically, how often are CRE infected- or -colonized patients identified from clini­
cal cultures collected in the following categories:
i. From cultures collected before or within 48 hours o f admission 
(i.e., transfers or community-onset)?
□  Daily □  Weekly □  M onthly □  Biannually □  Yearly □  N ot Identified
ii. From cultures collected after 48 hours of admission (i.e., hospital-onset)?
□  Daily □  Weekly □  M onthly □  Biannually □  Yearly □  N ot Identified
3. If  CRE cases have not been identified or have only rarely been identified (i.e., 0-3 cases 
per quarter), has your facility ever reviewed 6 to 12 months o f microbiology records
to detect any previously unrecognized CRE cases?
□  Yes □  No
If YES, did your review identify any previously unrecognized CRE cases?
□  Yes □  No
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4. Has your facility ever conducted a point prevalence survey (single round of active 
surveillance cultures) for CRE in high-risk units (e.g., units where previously unrecognized 
cases were identified, ICU, and units with high antimicrobial utility)?
□  Yes □  No
If YES, did your facility identify any unrecognized CRE?
□  Yes □  No
5. If  a CRE case is identified, does your facility conduct active surveillance testing o f patients 
with epidemiologic links to the CRE case (e.g., patients in same unit or who were provided 
care by same healthcare personnel)?
□  Yes □  No
6. If  a patient infected or colonized with CRE is identified, which of the following measures 
are implemented (check all that apply):
a. Place on Contact Pecautions □  Yes □  No
b. Place in single-patient rooms when possible □  Yes □  No
c. Other:___________________________________________________________
7. In your opinion, does your facility consider CRE to be an epidemiologically important 
multidrug-resistant organism for which specific infection control practices are indicated to 
eliminate transmission?
□  Strongly Agree □  Agree □  Neither □  Disagree □  Strongly Disagree
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In regions without known CRE, the emphasis should be on regional surveillance for CRE and education 
of healthcare personnel (e.g., infection prevention staff) to increase awareness.
Regions With No CRE Identified
I. Regional Surveillance 
and Feedback
A.
Make CRE laboratory-reportable 
OR
Survey all IPs or lab directors by phone or email 
(refer to Appendix C for an example of an IP survey)
Recommended Health 
Department Action
B.
If no CRE cases are identified:
° Feedback results to IPs and/or lab directors 
° Promote facility-level CRE guidance1
If CRE cases are identified:
° For regions with few CRE identified, 
refer to appropriate algorithm 
° For regions where CRE are common, 
refer to the appropriate algorithm
C.
Repeat survey/surveillance at least quarterly if CRE 
are present in neighboring jurisdictions; otherwise, 
repeat at least every 6 months
II. Education of All 
Healthcare Facilities2
• Explain importance o f CRE and provide updates 
on national and/or neighboring regional prevalence 
and epidemiology
• Review recommended surveillance and prevention 
measures1
• Increase vigilance for CRE detection
1. Refer to Part 1: Facility-Level Recommendations
2. Refers to all acute care hospitals and long-term care facilities that provide medical o r nursing care (e.g., long-term  acute care hospitals and skilled nursing 
facilities). Refer to the text for more details.
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Regions w ith  Few CRE Identified
In regions where CRE have been identified but cases remain uncommon, an aggressive approach to prevention 
is needed to prevent further transmission and widespread emergence of CRE. This will require increased prevention
efforts targeting select facilities in the region where CRE are found.
I. Regional Surveillance 
and Feedback
Recommended Health 
Department Action
C.
Repeat CRE surveillance and feedback at least quarterly
II. Infection Prevention For facilities without CRE but located in areas o f the region 
where CRE are present:
• Engage facility administrators to prioritize CRE 
prevention
• Ensure a CRE control plan is in place
• Reinforce core prevention measures
• Guide implementation of active surveillance testing and 
preemptive Contact Precautions for
° Patients admitted from facilities with ongoing 
CRE transmission 
° Patients admitted from long-term care
facilities (e.g., long-term acute care hospitals) 
or with CRE risk factors (e.g., open wounds, 
indwelling devices, high antimicrobial use)
B.
Feedback results to IPs and/or lab directors and to facility 
administrators (e.g., director) by email or letter
• Strongly consider providing facility identifiers; 
if not feasible, stratify results by geographic area 
and/or by facility type (acute vs. long-term care)
• Engage Hospital Association, Quality Improvement 
Organizations, and other relevant partners as needed 
to facilitate communication with facility leadership
• Provide facility-level CRE guidance1
A.
Make CRE laboratory-reportable 
OR
Survey all IPs or lab directors by phone or email 
(refer to Appendix C for an example of an IP survey)
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Algorithm  Continued for Regions w ith  Few CRE Identified:
¡i
For facilities with CRE:
• Engage facility administrators to prioritize 
CRE prevention
• Review infection prevention practices
to ensure core prevention measures are in place
• Provide in-service training (as needed)
• Ensure CRE screening is in place and guide 
implementation of supplemental measures1
• If  CRE rates do not decrease, consult CDC 
and/or regional experts for additional guidance
III. Inter-facility Communication
IV. Education of All 
Healthcare Facilities3 • Explain importance of CRE and provide updates 
on regional prevalence and epidemiology
• Review recommended surveillance and prevention 
measures1
• Increase vigilance for CRE detection
Ensure facilities with known CRE complete 
an inter-facility transfer form when transferring 
patients (indicate CRE status of patient, presence 
of open wounds/devices, antimicrobial use and 
ength of therapy)2
1. Refer to Part 1: Facility-Level Recommendations
2. http://w ww.cdc.gov/H AI/toolkits/InterfacilityTransferCom m unicationForm 11-2010.pdf
3. Includes all acute care facilities and long-term  care facilities that provide medical or nursing care 
(e.g, long-term  acute care hospitals and skilled nursing facilities). Refer to the text for more details.
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Regions Where CRE are Common
CRE containment in high-prevalent regions will require the implementation of core and supplemental prevention 
measures across all acute care and long-term care facilities that provide medical or nursing care (e.g., long-term acute
care hospitals and skilled nursing facilities).
I. Dedicated Personnel to Engage 
Healthcare Facilities
II. Regional Surveillance 
and Feedback
Recommended Health 
Department Action
C.
Repeat CRE surveillance and feedback at least quarterly
III. Infection Prevention
h
A.
Reinforce core prevention measures in all facilities
• Work closely with IPs to review practices
• Provide in-service training
B.
Determine if certain CRE events should be made reportable 
(e.g., fatalities)
A.
Perform steps for CRE surveillance and feedback of results 
to IPs and/or lab directors and facility administrators as 
outlined for regions with few CRE identified
• Ensure that urgency of situation is appropriately 
conveyed to facility leadership
• Assign specific personnel to this task
• Form advisory panel if additional technical support 
is needed
• Engage all facility administrators (e.g., director) and 
IP personnel early in process
° Engage Hospital Association, QIOs, and 
other relevant partners as needed to facilitate 
communication with facility leadership
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Algorithm  Continued for Regions Where CRE are Common:
B.
Consider supplemental measures in all facilities1,2
• Active surveillance testing and preemptive Contact 
Precautions for
° Patients admitted from facilities with ongoing 
CRE transmission or high CRE prevalence 
° Patients admitted from long-term care
facilities (e.g., long-term acute care hospitals) 
or with CRE risk factors (e.g., open wounds, 
indwelling devices, high antimicrobial use)
° Patients being admitted to high-risk units 
(e.g., ICUs)
• Chlorhexidine bathing on high-risk patients
C.
Assess Compliance to Prevention Measures
• At least monthly assessment (e.g., report from IPs)
• Share performance measures with facility 
administrators
• As needed, provide additional in-service training
IV. Inter-facility 
Communication
Ensure facilities with CRE cases complete an inter-facility 
transfer form (indicate CRE status, presence of open 
wounds/devices, antimicrobial use and length o f therapy)3
V. Assess Efficacy of Infection 
Prevention Measures
If  CRE rates do not decrease,
Intensify efforts in select facilities as needed
Implement additional interventions in consultation 
with CD C and/or regional experts and in accordance 
with CD C HICPAC M DRO guidelines2
1. Refer to Part 1: Facility-Level Recommendations
2. http://w w w .cdc.gov/ncidod/dhqp/pdf/ar/M D R O G uideline2006.pdf
3. http://w ww.cdc.gov/H AI/toolkits/InterfacilityTransferCom m unicationForm 11-2010.pdf
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